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RECENT CASES
DIVORCE -Constructive Desertion. Appeal by the husband
from a decree granting his wife a divorce on the ground of construc-
tive desertion together with alimony, counsel fees, and awarding
the wife custody of their two minor children. This was the second ac-
tion by the wife to obtain a divorce a vinculo nmatrinwnii, the earlier ac-
tion, alleging physical cruelty, having failed for lack of proof to
sustain the allegations. The present action was then commenced
alleging that the plaintiff had been forced to leave the defendant be-
cause of his conduct and that such desertion had extended over a
period of more than one year. The Master found that the plaintiff
was entitled to a divorce a vinculo inatrimonii upon the ground of
constructive desertion for a period of one year. This finding was
confirmed by the Juvenile-Domestic Relations Court, which in turn
was confirmed by the Court of Common Pleas. On appeal, HELD:
reversed in part. The portion of the decree granting to respondent
a divorce a vinculo inatrimonii is reversed, but in all other respects
the decree appealed from is affirmed. In order to constitute con-
structive desertion, the conduct complained of must, in itself and
independently, amount to one or more of the grounds for divorce
permitted by the constitutional amendment. Mincie v'. Mincie, S. C.
Sup. Ct., Feb. 1, 1954.
While the doctrine of constructive desertion is generally recog-
nized, there is an irreconcilable conflict in authorities as to the charac-
ter of misconduct that must be shown to justify a divorce on this
ground. Constructive desertion should never be permitted to be
used as a subterfuge for obtaining a divorce on a ground not per-
mitted by the Constitution. Machado v. Machado, 220 S. C. 90, 66
S.E. 2d 629 (1951). Conduct of wife, alleged by husband as ground
for constructive desertion, did not constitute physical cruelty within
the meaning of S. C. Divorce Statute. Barstow v. Barstow, 223 S. C.
136, 74 S. E. 2d 541 (1953). In action for a divorce a vincudo nmtri-
nonii, in order to establish constructive desertion, conduct of the
offending spouse must be such as would support an action for a di-
vorce a mensa et thoro. Martin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 11 S.E.
12 (1890). Cruel treatment justifying wife in leaving husband is
same as cruel treatment affording ground for divorce. Mullikin v.
Mullikin, 200 Ga. 638, 38 S.E. 2d 281 (1946). A divorce will not
be granted except for legal cause prescribed by statute. Alexander
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v. Alexander, 165 N. C. 45, 80 S.E. 890 (1914). The contrary
view, that conduct need not be such as to independently support an
action for divorce, is more widely accepted. Machado v. Machado,
supra; Note A.L.R. 2d 1428, 1436 (1951) ; 4 S. C. L. Q. 318 (1951).
Non-support, while not statutory ground for divorce, is sufficient cause
for constructive desertion as ground for divorce. Griffin v. Griffin,
207 Miss. 500, 42 So. 2d 720 (1949); Cooper v. Cooper, 176 Md.
695, 4 A. 2d 714 (1939). If husband, by conduct or wrongful acts,
compels wife to leave home, though wife's conduct may not be above
reproach, he is the deserting party if his conduct is the more repre-
hensible. Weatherspoon v. Weat],erspoon, 195 Or. 660, 246 P. 2d
581 (1952). In declaring the conduct necessary to constitute grounds
for constructive desertion in England, Vaisey, J. said, ". . . the
misconduct on which a case of desertion [constructive] would be
founded would nowadays rarely if ever amount to a matrimonial
offense, because such an offense, if it existed, would itself give the
other spouse a right to relief and obviate the necessity for any ap-
plication of the doctrine". Buckler v. Buckler (1947) Prob. 25,
(1947) 1 All Eng. 319 - CA.
In the instant case the court has announced the type of conduct
necessary to constitute constructive desertion as a ground for di-
vorce in South Carolina. By declaring that only one or more of the
grounds set forth in the constitutional amendment would justify a
divorce on constructive desertion, the court has refused to admit
actual constructive desertion as a fifth ground for the severance of
matrimonial ties in this state. It has long been settled law that the
r-omplaining party may be awarded separate maintenance when the
conduct of the offending spouse is such that cohabitation is rendered
unsatisfactory, thus gaining only a moral victory in the courts. The
parties to such a decree of special maintenance are denied the bene-
fits of marriage while still burdened with the duties. In contempla-
tion of law the parties are married, and may dissolve the order of
the court by rejoining in marriage. Perhaps the court believes that
by burdening both with the disadvantages, coupled with none of the
advantages, the parties might forget their difficulties, reunite and
preserve the home. It is undoubtedly laudatory for the court to
follow a policy not to make divorces too easily available, however,
in such as the instant case, where the parties twice sought relief
from the contract of marriage, it is highly improbable that a reconcilia-
tion might be effected. It is suggested that substantial relief be al-
lowed in cases as this in order to prevent the spreading practice of
1954]
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such parties resorting to other jurisdictions for adequate solutions
to their problems.
DEXTER R. HAMILTON.
TRADE REGULATION - Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act - Con-
sumer Interest As Basis of Review. Petitioner Sought judicial re-
view and setting aside of an order by Federal Security Administrator
allowing optional vitamin content of oleomargarine to be supplied
by synthetic as -well as natural sources without indicating the source
on the label. Petitioner dealt in fish oil which was a natural source.
He alleged he was "adversely affected" as both producer and con-
sumer since he and members of his family as prospective consumers
would be affected by the inclusion of the harmful ingredients. On
motion by the Administrator to dismiss the petition for lack of juris-
diction, HELD: motion denied. Petition, however, was dismissed
on its merits. Petitioner's allegations of interest as consumer did
meet the jurisdictional requirements for securing judicial review as
authorized by section 701 (f) (1) of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act. Reade v. Ewing, 205 F. 2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
A party appealing from the order of the FDA relating to the
labelling of food must be adversely affected by the order and there
must be a case of actual, not merely colorable, controversy as to
validity of the order. Federal Food, Drug and Cosvwtic Act, S401,
701 (f) (1), 21 U.S.C. S341, 371 (f) (1) ; U. S. Cane Sugar Refiners
Assn. v. McNutt, 138 F. 2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943); Land O'Lakes
Creameries, Inc. v. McNutt, 132 F. 2d 633 (8th Cir. 1943); A. E.
Staley Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 120 F. 2d 258 (7th Cir. 1941).
The immediate concern of each petitioner is to show by allegation that
he is "adversely affected" in order to avoid a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction under the statutory requirements. But, in order to come
within the meaning of the statute, what economic capacity must the
petitioner allege so that he could be considered a person "adversely
affected" by the order? Previously, a supplier of an ingredient that
had been excluded by an order of the FDA was held to be a person
"adversely affected". A. E. Staley Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture,
supra. Likewise, a butter producer was allowed to question the stan-
dard for oleomargarine. Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. McNutt,
supra. Conversely, a marketer of a competitive produce was held not
to be a person "adversely affected". U. S. Cane Sugar Refiners Assn.
v. McNutt, supra. A producer of lecithin met with the same result
[Vol. 6
3
et al.: RECENT CASES
Published by Scholar Commons, 1954
RECZNT CASE4S
when he objected to the standard of identity fixed by an order of
the FDA. American Lecithin Co. v. McNutt, 155 F. 2d 785 (2d Cir.
1946). In all of the above cases, the petitioners sought review on
the basis of their economic standing as producers, suppliers, or manu-
facturers. Some were allowed standing to review while an equal
number were dismissed. The scope and meaning of persons "adverse-
ly affected" as enunciated under section 701 (f) (1) of the Act, was
not altogether clear. See: Federal Food, Drug and Cosnetic Act,
67 Harv. L. Rev. 632, 669 (1954). What was apparent, however,
was that producers, suppliers, or persons in similar capacities could
be met by a successful jurisdictional objection on the part of the
government.
The petitioner in the instant case alleged his interest as producer
and consumer, although the reviewing court only considered his con-
sumer interest. An earlier case suggested that consumers would
have the necessary interest to come within the statute. Land O'Lakes
Creameries, Inc. v. McNutt, supra. That an individual, who himself
had no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given
by statute, may bring an action, is not new. Marvin v. Trout, 199
U. S. 212 (1905). Qui tam suits, as they are called, have been fre-
quently permitted by legislative action. U. S. ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
317 U. S. 537, 541 (1942) ; Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 22 N.W.
641 (1885); Barrows v. Farnums, 254 Mass. 240, 150 N.E. 206
(1926). A striking example is the Federal Informers Act which
authorizes private citizens to sue, in behalf of the government, other
persons who obtained money from the government under fraudulent
claims. See U. S. ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra. However, in other
areas repeated attempts by private litigants to obtain a special stake
in public rights have been consistently denied. Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302
U. S. 464 (1937); Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 311
U. S. 295 (1940). But in Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Com-
munications Commission, 316 U. S. 4 (1942), private litigants were
allowed standing as representatives of public interest. The court
has jurisdiction of appeals by a "person aggrieved" or 'by one "whose
interests are adversely affected" by the Commissioner's decision.
F. C. C. v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470 (1939). On the
other hand, a person's affected interest must be such as to be unlaw-
fully invaded by the order and not merely danum absque injuria.
Ala. Power Co. v. Greenwood, 302 U. S. 485 (1937). Though Con-
gress can confer on no one the right to bring an action in the absence
of justifiable controversy, it may constitutionally authorize one such
1954]
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as the Attorney General to bring a proceeding to prevent another
official from acting in violation of his statutory powers, for then,
there is an actual controversy. Instead of designating the Attorney
General, Congress may constitutionally enact a statute conferring
on any non-official person authority to bring a suit whose sole pur-
pose is to vindicate the public interest. "Such persons, so authorized,
are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals". Associated Industries
v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). Thus, private litigants
gained the necessary interests to be persons "adversely affected".
The way was made clear for private individuals in their economic
capacity as consumers to seek judicial review of standards promul-
gated under order of the FDA.
The principal case appears to be the first in which the petitioner
alleged his consumer interest to be "adversely affected". Previously,
various restrictions had been imposed upon producers and competi-
tors of producers. The line was apparently drawn in the U. S. Cane
Sugar Refiners' Assn. v. McNutt decision, where, upon dismissing the
petition, the court thought the alleged injury too speculative. The
instant case represents an attempt to skirt these producer's restric-
tions, since the petitioner alleged his dual capacity of producer and
consumer. This avenue would seem wide open; obviously, producers
and there families are consumers or potential consumers, as is almost
any other individual who may see fit to object to the standard. See:
Christopher, Significant Comments, 8 Food, Drug, Cosmetic L. J.
600, 608 (1953). The only limitation laid down by the instant court
was that the allegations not be "frivolous". But, as a practical matter,
has the producer's position changed? More often than not, he, as
a consumer, will be unable to lodge more than a "frivolous" objection
as a matter of proof. Hence, if a producer wishes to take full ad-
vantage of his knowledge and -resources, his status as producer must
be alleged. The object of the instant case would appear to be primari-
ly directed to the consumer's singular benefit. The court undoubtedly
bad the consumer in mind when it spoke of non-official litigants
appearing as private "Attorney Generals" for the purpose of vindi-
cating the public interest. There is no apparent objection and every
justification in allowing the consumer his standing of review. After
all, the fundamental purpose of the Act is his protection. The only
cause for concern would appear to be the threat of endless lines of
consumers cluttering the standard-setting procedure. Here again,
a practical approach to the matter would be applicable. Just how
many consumers would be sufficiently interested in seeking review
of a standard label? Probably very few and even fewer would be
(Vol. 6
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grievously affected by the inclusion of a harmful ingredient not listed
on the label. If the latter group be sufficiently interested, then the
new consumer standing would answer their need. Here is the real
meaning behind the principal case. Certainly, the satisfied producer
is not going to appeal a case nor is the FDA, who determined the
standard where a harmful ingredient was included, perhaps inad-
vertently, in the standard. The consumer, here, fully qualifies as a
person "adversely affected" and should be given every right to seek
his standing on review. It is on this basis that the instant decision
seems clearly sound.
WIIIA2m C. DAVIs, JR. A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Power to Rezone. In 1920 plaintiff,
American University, was classified "'A' Residential" by defendant
zoning commission. This district was to include private dwellings,
apartment houses, hotels, hospitals, sanitariums, churches, and the
like. Since that time, plaintiff has become surrounded by expensive
residences and now desires to construct a hospital on the campus. This
was emphatically opposed by property owners in that area because
of possible impairment of property values, creation of traffic conges-
tion, noise, and invasions of privacy. After a petition was filed with
defendant, a hearing was held and an order issued rezoning the
entire area to " 'A' Residential Restricted". If the order is to stand
the hospital may not be built by plaintiff. On appeal from the
zoning commission, the district court HELD: The rezoning was
without relation to public safety, health, morals, or the general wel-
fare and was a taking of property without due process of law. Ameri-
can University v. Prentiss, 113 F. Supp. 389 (D.C. 1953).
Generally speaking, zoning is constitutional if it bears a substan-
tial relation to public safety, health, morals, or general welfare. Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); State of
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S.
116 (1928) ; American Wood Products Co. v. Minneapolis, 21 F. 2d
440 (D. Minn. 1927). Municipalities may adopt zoning ordinances
as an exercise of their police power and thereby impose a reasonable
restraint upon the use of private property, Johnson v. Village of Villa
Park, 370 Ill. 272, 18 N.E. 2d 887 (1939), when they are fairly
within the well-recognized bounds of such power. People v. Scrafano,
307 Mich. 655, 12 N.W. 2d 325 (1943). Moreover, in order that
a zoning measure be valid, it is necessary that the public interest
1954]
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in it reasonably outbalance individual personal and property rights
opposed to it. Wood v. District of Columbia, 39 A. 2d 67 (D.C.
Mun. 1944). A municipal corporation has no inherent police power
and hence it has no inherent zoning power. Accordingly, municipal
power must exist, if at all, by virtue of a delegation from the state.
Kass v. Hedgpeth, 226 N.C. 405, 38 S. E. 2d 164 (1946). This
delegation may be conferred by statutes, or by constitutional or char-
ter provisions. Generally, it is conferred by zoning or enabling acts.
Julian v. Golden Rule Oil Co., 112 Kans. 671, 212 Pac. 884 (1923).
Zoning ordinances are presumed to be valid and within the purview
of police power in the absence of a showing that they are arbitrary
or unreasonable. Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 332,
175 P. 2d 542 (1946). If the question is fairly debatable, the zon-
ing order must stand. Levanthal v. District of Columbia, 100 F. 2d
94 (D.C. Cir. 1938). The rules as to the limitations on the zoning
power apply to an amendatory ordinance as well as to an original
zoning ordinance. Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. City of Cincinnati,
60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E. 2d 993 (1938). Rezoning, as well as
original zoning, is subject to the legislative discretion of the city
council or other zoning authority, Leventhal v. District of Columbia,
supra, and courts will not interfere therewith except for abuse clear-
ly beyond dispute. Rogers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115,
96 N.E. 2d 731 (1951). While property owners have no vested
rights by reason of the enactment of a zoning regulation so as to
preclude a change in such regulation, Page v. City of Portland, 178
Or. 632, 165 P. 2d 280 (1946), they do have a right to rely on a rule
of law that a classification made by a zoning ordinance will not be
changed unless the change is required for the public good. Debartolo
v. Village of Oak Park, 396 Ill. 404, 71 N.E. 2d 693 (1947). In-
deed, it is fundamental that zoning ordinances must not infringe con-
stitutional guarantees by invading personal or property rights un-
necessarily or unreasonably. Forde v. City of Miamt Beach, 146
Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941). In determining whether invasion of
property rights under a purported police power, as by zoning, is rea-
sonable, the character of the neighborhood, the use to which nearby
property is put and the extent to which the property values are di-
minished by the provisos of the zoning ordinance must be considered.
Sinclair Refining Co. v. City of Chicago, 178 F. 2d 214 (7th Cir.
1949). Each case must be determined on its own particular facts.
City of Pittsfield v. Oleksak, 313 Mass. 553, 47 N.E. 2d 930 (1943).
A zoning ordinance may be valid in its general aspects, yet invalid
as applied to a particular piece of property and a particular set of
[Vol. 6
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facts. Anderman v. City of Chicago, 379 Ill. 236, 40 N. E. 2d 51
(1942). Therefore, when the facts show zoning regulations bear
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare, there is a taking of property without due process of law,
and the regulations are unconstitutional and void. City of Birming-
ham v. Monk, 185 F. 2d 859 (5th Cir. 1951).
In the instant case, while applying these broad general principles,
the court based its decision on the facts and surrounding circumstances.
The foregoing decisions show that it was correct in so doing. Here
the area rezoned included the entire university campus, a seventy-
acre tract, when actually only a small eight-acre plot on the edge
of the campus affected the adjoining landowners. No substantial evi-
dence was brought out to show property values would be impaired.
As to noise, it is commonly known that hospitals establish "quiet
zones" for the welfare of the patients. Further, because of the
particular location of the property here involved, the evidence showed
that traffic in this area is heavy and any additional traffic, which
would be a mere six or seven per cent increase due to the hospital,
could be absorbed without difficulty. The trend in this area of the
law is toward more restrictions in the use of urban property; how-
ever, it must be kept in mind that courts in deciding these problems
try to balance the conflicting interests of the particular parties in-
volved. A balancing of public interest as against private interests
in property adversely affected is necessary to determine the reason-
ableness of zoning, its constitutionality and validity. Although
governed by fundamental principles, discussed in the paragraph
above, balancing must be present in each case and cannot be settled
by any rule of law. Urban zoning in one area may be absolutely
necessary and reasonable while the same zoning in another, where the
circumstances are different, would be arbitrary and unreasonable.
The facts in the case at band seem to bring it under the latter situa-
tion.
EmoRY B. BRocK.
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